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Abstract. The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming a reality and the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is the main open standardiza-
tion body responsible for it. The IoT implies billions of new devices
connected to the Internet and, while several problems like interoperabil-
ity and routing have been solved, security solutions suited for IoT are
still an active field of research. This document is a survey of the state of
the art at IETF of security related protocols for IoT. The needed IETF
background and a highlight of current efforts on security for IoT is of-
fered. An insight of unsolved problems and future perspectives on IETF
concludes this survey. This is an informational document and detailed
description of the protocols is not on scope.
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1 Introduction
This document gives an overview of the current state of the art of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) working groups dealing with several aspects of
security on constrained nodes and networks. The security aspects addressed by
the presented protocols include: encryption (confidentiality), message authenti-
cation (integrity), entity authentication, and fine-grained authorization.
Security-related protocols and architectures were historically aimed for tradi-
tional networks -like the Internet- and devices. They where not conceived to work
on constrained nodes or networks; these constraints include for example: nodes
with limited RAM, ROM, CPU power and energy, high latency and unreliable
network transmissions.
The aforementioned constraints add additional challenges when implement-
ing or designing security protocols and architectures. Most of them simply cannot
run on constrained environments. Hence new protocols and architectures need
to be defined for achieving security goals on constrained nodes and networks.
The aim of the IETF is to re-use to the greatest extent possible the already
defined security protocols and architectures adapting them to the constrained
world of the Internet Of Things (IoT).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents a chrono-
logical summary of the IETF IoT-oriented working groups and most important
protocols. Chapter 3 presents the fundamental standards that are the base for the
security-related protocols. Chapter 4 deals specifically with the IETF security-
related protocols categorizing them according to the layer they apply: network,
transport or application. Chapter 5 presents the Authentication and Authoriza-
tion Framework for IoT: ACE, currently being defined at IETF. Finally, Chapter
6 offers a summary of the unsolved security problems that yet need to be ad-
dressed and future axes of research at IETF.
2 A brief history of the IETF IoT-oriented working
groups
The first efforts of IETF protocols adapted for the Internet of Things (IoT) date
back to 2005 with the 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low power WPAN) working group
(WG) which provided the first adaptation of IPv6 for constrained-node networks
on RFC4944: Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks[1]
published on 2007-09. The ROLL (Routing Over Low power and Lossy net-
works) WG addressed the routing problem on 6LoWPANs with the design and
publication of RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks
(LLN)[2] published on 2012-03. These documents provided the foundations IoT
world allowing IPv6 connectivity on Low-Power and Lossy Networks.
Since around the year 2010 with the start of the CoRE (Constrained REST-
ful Environments) WG we can observe a growing interest on the IETF about
constrained environment related working groups and protocols. The CoRE WG
deals with application-level goals and one of his most valuable outputs has been
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)[3] (RFC 7252). The 6lo (IPv6 over
Networks of Resource-constrained Nodes) WG further continues the work of the
6LoWPAN WG and aims to facilitate IPv6 connectivity over constrained node
networks with heterogeneous link layer technologies; similarly, 6TiSCH (IPv6
over the TSCH -Timeslotted Channel Hopping- mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) WG
focus on enabling IPv6 over the TSCH mode of the IEEE 802.15.4e standard.
LWIG (Light-Weight Implementation Guidance) WG publishes guidelines for
implementation of all these protocols in constrained nodes and has standardized
a common terminology to be used on future standards.
The IPv6 adaptation 6LoWPAN, the RPL routing protocol, and the CoAP
application protocol have become the pillar protocols for connectivity and in-
teroperability on the IoT. Other IoT-related protocols are The User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) published on 1980 and the Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) protocol published on 2006, even if they pre-date the IoT paradigm they
are well suited to solve the IoT constraints. All this protocols constitute what
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Fig. 1. IETF Protocols stack for: (a) Standard Internet; (b) Internet of Things;
has become the basic IoT stack. This IoT stack3 side by side with the standard
Internet protocols stack can be seen on Figure 1.
Security-oriented WGs started to arise starting from the year 2013 with
the DICE (DTLS In Constrained Environments) WG profiling DTLS for
IoT and later with the ACE WG dealing with Authentication and Authoriza-
tion on Constrained Environments. The 6lo (IPv6 over Networks of Resource-
constrained Nodes) and 6TiSCH WGs also started to focus on security-related
milestones. In general all the IoT groups started to focus on security once the
deployment of the base IoT protocols started to become a reality but the basic
security needs where not yet addressed.
3 Fundamentals
This chapter presents the fundamental standards that are the base for the
security-related protocols that will be presented later.
3.1 Nomenclature
Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks[4] (RFC7228) defines a common
terminology that has been used thoroughly on all the other IETF constrained
environments new protocols. One important output is the distinction of three
different Classes of Constrained Devices shown on Table 1.
Table 1. Classes of devices according to RFC7228 [4]
Device Class RAM (KB) Flash (KB)
Class 0 << 10 << 100
Class 1 ≈ 10 ≈100
Class 2 100 250
3 With the addition of the CBOR binary data format, that will be introduced further
on this paper.
Class 0 devices are assumed to not have the resources required to commu-
nicate directly with the Internet in a secure manner. Class 2 devices have not
difficulties implementing standard protocols. Class 1 devices are assumed on
most new security solutions and protocol adaptations; in other words, current
IETF for IoT security proposals are targeted to devices with 10 KB of RAM
10KB and 100 KB of Flash.
Having a standardized terminology helps to properly describe the different
problematics on IoT in a consistent way and propose solutions accordingly.
3.2 CoAP Protocol and Security
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)[3] (RFC 7252) is a specialized
web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained networks.
One of its main goals is to provide a RESTful transfer service similar to HTTP,
but simplified for the use on constrained devices on constrained networks. CoAP
provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints,
supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of
the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. Even if CoAP has been designed
to run over UDP, it can be adapted to run on top of any other datagram oriented
protocol (e.g.: CoAP-over-SMS, CoAP-over-LoRaWAN, CoAP-over-Bluetooth
Low Energy).
Security in CoAP. The standardized approach for securing CoAP (securing
meaning confidentiality and integrity) is using the Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Version 1.2 (RFC 6347). CoAP assumes that the cryptographic
credentials are already previsioned, and defines four security modes:
1. NoSec: There is no protocol-level security (DTLS is disabled).
2. PreSharedKey: DTLS is enabled and pre-shared keys ciphersuites are used.
3. RawPublicKey: DTLS is enabled and the device has an asymmetric key
pair without a certificate that is validated using an out-of-band mechanism.
4. Certificate: DTLS is enabled and the device has an asymmetric key pair
with an X.509 certificate.
CoAP does not have primitives to assure neither authentication or authoriza-
tion; if these security services are required they will have to be provided either
by communication security (i.e., IPsec or DTLS) or by object security (within
the payload). The DICE (DTLS In Constrained Environments) and ACE (Au-
thentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments) working groups
were created to asses the remaining challenges and complete an appropriate
framework needed for a secure IoT environment.
3.3 CBOR: Concise Binary Object Representation
The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)[5] (RFC 7049) is a binary
data format inspired by JSON and aimed at compact representation of most
common data types used at Internet standards; it also has the explicit goals of
a lightweight implementation in terms of code and ram needed, and no needed
schema description to decode. It is normally used on top of CoAP to represent
information.
4 IETF security at different layers
IETF has developed IoT security solutions at all the layers it is competent,
this includes network-layer (Layer 3) and above. Security at link-layer (Layer 2)
and below are not on scope of IETF. Different types of applications will need
security at different layers. There is a rough consensus currently at IETF to go
for application layer security (also called object security), on spite of the others:
network-layer solution is seen as cumbersome, difficult to implement and not so
lightweight; transport-layer provides some end-to-end (e2e) security problems at
the presence of proxies; on the contrary application layer is seen as the most
flexible solution and suitable for caching and proxying while maintaining e2e
security properties. We will present security solutions at each layer.
4.1 Security at network-layer
Security at network-layer is the less active field at IETF. Security is based on
adaptations of the IPsec protocol suite: IKEv2 and ESP. The LWIG working
group is the home for this efforts. RFC 7815: Minimal Internet Key Exchange
Version 2 (IKEv2) Initiator Implementation [6] is the most important document
and presents a lightweight version of the IKEv2 protocol; this protocol is used
for performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining security
associations (fresh keys) on the IPsec suite. To encrypt the data a minimal ver-
sion of the IP Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) is being currently worked
on the same working group, however the future of IPsec encryption for IoT is
not clear, and seems to be relegated to higher layer security solutions.
4.2 Security at transport-layer
Transport-layer solution for IoT is provided by Datagram Transport Layer Secu-
rity (DTLS). A special working group DTLS In Constrained Environments (dice)
was created to define a DTLS profile suited for IoT. The output document is
Transport Layer Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things (RFC 7925 [7]). This document dictates how
to set available configurable options and protocol extensions: e.g. setting timers
values, choosing appropriate DTLS ciphersuites. The three types of credentials
to use correspond which the mandate of CoAP: (1) for PSK the mandatory ci-
phersuite is TLSPSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8; (2) for raw public key the ciphersuite
is TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 which uses elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy; (3) for certificates the mandatory ciphersuite is the same as raw public
key, but the key will be wrapped on a X.509 v3 certificate. After the DTLS
authentication credentials have been used on the DTLS handshake protocol all
methods encrypt with the same symmetric algorithm AES-128-CCM, with an 8
byte tag/integrity value. Once we encrypt the DTLS per datagram overhead is
of 13 bytes without counting the tag.
One of the advantages of transport-layer security is that can be used to
transport any application data, including CoAP. Hence most IETF IoT protocols
assumed at least a PSK between nodes, the establishment of a DTLS channel
following the guidelines of DICE and then security was guaranteed. However, one
of the drawbacks of this solution is that end-to-end security cannot be achieved
in the presence of CoAP proxies (forwarding, caching), the DTLS secure channel
will have to be terminated at the proxy, this led to the definition of higher layer
security solutions.
4.3 Security at application-layer
Security at this layer, also referred as object security, has the advantage that
can be maintained end-to-end and the security properties can be set on a per-
message basis. The pillar of object security is CBOR Object Signing and En-
cryption (COSE) [8]. COSE describes how to create and process encryption, sig-
natures and message authentication codes using CBOR for serialization.COSE
will has more flexible security properties than DTLS but at the cost of more
overhead. COSE is used to build upon other solutions like Object Security of
CoAP (OSCOAP) [9]. OSCOAP provides end-to-end encryption, integrity, and
replay protection of CoAP messages. It has two modes one only protecting pay-
load, and other also protecting CoAP certain options and header fields. It also
provides a secure binding between CoAP request and response messages, and
freshness of requests and responses.
4.4 Security at layers summary
A summary of the mentioned security solutions contrasted with the IoT non-
secured protocols and standard Internet protocols can be seen on Table 2.
Table 2. IETF security at different layers: Protocols
Layer Std. Internet Secure Std. Internet IoT Secure IoT
Application HTTP HTTPS CoAP,CBOR OSCOAP,COSE
Transport TCP TLS UDP DTLS
Network IP IKEv2+IPsec(ESP) 6LoWPAN Min.IKEv2+ESP
5 An Authentication and Authorization Framework:
OAuth 2.0 for IoT
The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)
working group is the most active on developing a comprehensive security so-
lution for the IoT. As his title depicts the main objectives are Authentication
and Authorization, encryption will be leveraged on solutions previously men-
tioned like iot-profiled-DTLS or object security. The working group has two
explicit goals: (1) Produce use cases and requirements and (2) Identify authenti-
cation and authorization mechanisms suitable for resource access in constrained
environments. The first goal has been addressed and the second goal is being
addressed by the work-in-progress: Authentication and Authorization for Con-
strained Environments (ACE) [10]. This section will offer an overview of the cur-
rent ACE solution. The building blocks of the solution are: CoAP, CBOR/COSE,
the OAuth 2.0 framework and the proof-of-possession tokens.
5.1 Standard OAuth 2.0
OAuth 2.0 is an open standard that enables a resource owner to grant a third-
party limited access to a protected resource; is designed to be used over HTTP
and TLS. Access Tokens are authorization credentials that grant access to pro-
tected resources. The Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Tokens are access tokens bound
to a specific cryptographic key. To access a protected resource not only the token
must be possessed but also the possession of the associated key must be proven.
One important security property of PoP tokens is that they can be transported
over unsecured channels.
5.2 ACE’s IoT OAuth 2.0
ACE’s OAuth v2.0 for the IoT uses PoP access tokens; HTTP is replaced by
CoAP and JSON by CBOR, CoAP runs over UDP instead of TCP, and hence
DTLS should be used instead of TLS. Application-layer security solutions are
also envisioned and are based on COSE (CBOR Encoded Message Syntax)[8]
and OSCOAP (Object Security of CoAP).
OAuth Entities: The main entities involved in the OAuth framework are:
– Resource Server (RS): An entity which hosts a protected resource.
– Client (C): An entity which attempts to access a protected resource on a
RS.
– Authorization Server (AS): An entity that enforces the Resource Owner ’s
policies, prepares and endorses authorization and authentication data.
OAuth Message Flows: The procedure that allows C to get access to a
protected resource is the following:
1. C sends a Token Request message to the AS.
2. If C is authorized AS generates and sends to C the Access Token (opaque to
C) and Client Information (e.g. contains the key bound to the PoP access
token).
3. C sends the Access Token to RS and the protected resource Request
4. RS validates the request with the associated access token, if successful, re-
sponds with an (encrypted) representation of the protected resource.
Fig. 2. OAuth 2.0 Basic Messages Flow and Entities
Figure 2 represents the basic OAuth 2.0 message flow and its main entities.
The PoP Token offers the secure establishment of an authenticated
key -with associated authorization permissions- between previously
unknown parties and over an unsecured channel. This fresh key can be
further used to establish authenticated and secured communications between
these parties.
6 IETF perspectives, industrial applications and
conclusion
IETF Perspectives. The IETF is providing tools that permit today to offer
an IoT-suited security solution for most of the devices and use cases. There is
still unsolved problems. Provisioning-bootstrapping of cryptographic material is
also being studied at the Thing-to-Thing research group, all current solutions
assume some pre-previsioning or a trusted third party. Cryptographic generated
Identities, ID-based cryptography and new elliptic curves are also current topics
studied at the crypto forum research group. Solutions for Low-Power Wide Area
Networks with ultra-low speeds/bandwidth are needed and will be addressed on
a future WG: LPWAN (IPv6 over Low Power Wide-Area Networks).
The ACE WG is defining a comprehensive security framework that aims at
solving most of IoT use cases, but time awareness is required at the constrained
node. New types of time-constrained terminology are needed and solutions that
do not rely on time synchronization will need to be proposed.
Industrial. Industrial applications are using IETF’s already well-established IoT
protocols such as CoAP adapting it to their needs (e.g.: running on TCP). Most
recent protocols (e.g: COSE) or in-progress ones (ACE Framework) will take
time to be adopted on the industrial world due to the conservative nature of
it. However, we believe that the time required for the IETF protocols to be
adopted by the industry will likely decrease. We base our last assertion on the
good interaction between IEEE (a body more associated with the industry) and
IETF for example defining cross-layer solutions at the 6TiSCH working group;
also the now forming LPWAN WG has some key technology players (SIGFOX,
LoRA Alliance, Wi-SUN, NarrowBand-IOT) being involved, and ACE WG has
some industrial referents such as Ericsson and ARM; meaning they will give
valuable input to future protocols, making them more aligned with the industrial
needs, and more likely to be quickly adopted.
Conclusion. Secure Identity representation, Bootstrapping, Privacy, and Multicast-
security are some of the yet unsolved problems. IETF might never arrive to a
one-fits-all solution, but the open nature of the protocols and layered design are
enough tools to make security for IoT a reality.
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